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 Regardless of our evaluation of the results and quality of the transition in Cro-
atia, it seems justified to take 1995 as the year when the transition was over. Until 
then the main democratic institutions were formally crafted and established and 
the new regime was something quite different from the socialist rule. The new re-
gime emerged as the result of institutionalization of the HDZ movement into po-
litical regime, with two distinct characteristics: a) in terms of substance, the re-
gime was an authoritarian regime; b) the regime acquired its legitimacy through 
reasonably free and fair democratic procedures. Such an authoritarian democracy 
(in contrast to authoritarian dictatorship) precluded democratic consolidation (ei-
ther in terms of quality or in terms of duration) almost by definition, which can be 
additionally shown at the constitutional, behavioural and attitudinal level. Never-
theless, the January elections opened the space for the Croatian democracy to con-
solidate. Whether consolidation will be successfully crafted is still not clear. 
 
 Introduction 
 Works dealing with political development in Croatia in the last ten years under the 
theoretical framework of democratization (i.e. democratic transition and consolidation) 
are rare. This is true for domestic social science as well as for foreign scientists dealing 
with the case of Croatia (or ex-Yugoslavia), whether as a case study or within cross-na-
tional comparative analyses. The reasons for this are primarily in the peculiar processes 
that took place in the late 80s and at the beginning of the 90s within the then common 
state of Yugoslavia: the dissolution of the federal state, which happened simultaneously 
with the demise of the communist regime, and the war between the Yugoslav republics 
that followed. 
 As a consequence of these facts foreign observers focused on the problems at federal 
level or on the relations between the republics more than on the inner development in 
the constituent republics – the level at which transition(s) actually occurred. Also, under 
the pressure of actual events, the focus shifted to the variables that are “environmental” 
to the transitional processes or, at best, “preconditions” for transition to democracy. 
Thus the scientific agenda has been preoccupied with such issues as the breakdown of 
the federative state, the independence of constituent republics and its consequences, na-
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tionalism and national self-determination, war, history, development of ethnic identities, 
conflict-resolution and peace, the role of the international community, etc. As a conse-
quence, possible explanations inspired by political science have been overwhelmed by 
other, usually more deterministic approaches, and the transition to democracy itself 
(and, consequently, consolidation) has been either taken for granted, or put aside, or ex-
plicitly denied, but rarely explored.1 
 Furthermore, scholars who engaged in comparative analyses of democratization 
found, in the peculiarities of the events in and around Croatia, variables that are not easy 
to control in comparative empirical research. “Yugoslav exceptionalism” has served not 
only as a crucial case for the claim that post-communist transitions cannot be compared 
to the democratic transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America (Bunce, 1995: 987); 
it has meant exclusion of the former Yugoslav cases from many studies dealing with 
cases within the universe of post-communist countries, too. (Elster/Offe/Preuss, 1998: 
7; Linz/Stepan, 1996: xvii) These scientific reasons, accompanied with the practical ef-
fects of the war on the academic enterprise (obstacles to travel, communication, prob-
lems of gathering reliable data on the political system of Croatia, etc.) contributed to the 
fact that the amount of literature on regime transformation in Croatia is not very impres-
sive.2 
 Nevertheless, despite all the limitations, it seems that the concepts of democratic 
transition and consolidation can be of a valuable interpretative help in addressing the 
problem of political development in Croatia in the last ten years. In this paper I adhere 
to the approach that views both concepts in accordance to their “minimalist” definitions. 
Firstly, both transition and consolidation refer exclusively to the level of political proc-
esses, institutions and actors i.e. to what is used to be called the political order. What-
ever crucial role changes in the economic, social or cultural sphere could play in transi-
tion, they should be considered as variables with the outside effects on transition. Sec-
ondly, transition is considered over when basic democratic institutions and procedures 
are irreversibly settled down, regardless on stability and quality of their functioning. 
Achievement of quality and stability is a task of consolidation which is, though can be 
entailed in the very transitional processes, theoretically distinct, structurally different 
and, in principle, subsequent process. Many authors powerfully showed advantages of 
such an approach to the problems of democratic transition and consolidation (Przewor-
ski, 1986; Di Palma 1990; O`Donnell 1992; Valenzuela, 1992; Gunther/Diamandouros 
/Puhle, 1995; Linz/Stepan 1996).  
 
 
1 There are, however, a few exceptions. Mirjana Kasapović (1996, 153-178) is the author who uses 
transitological categories in analyzing political processes in Croatia in the past decade in the strictest way. For 
other authors see also Pusić, 1999, Grdešić, 1997, and Kasapović/Zakošek, 1997. 
2 I do not take into account the studies which just pretend to talk about Croatian or ex-Yugoslav 
transition(s) by including the terms like transition, transformation or democratization in their titles, but 
actually use them as temporal denotation and by no means as a conceptual scheme. This is not uncommon 
phenomenon, since the very terms gained, among social scientists, much more popularity than the more or 
less strict methods, concepts and theories hidden behind them.  
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 The Missed Opportunity of Transition 
 The Croatian transition from authoritarian rule was a rather clear case of transforma-
tion in Huntington's terms (Huntington, 1991, 109-142). From the beginning of the lib-
eralization of the communist regime to the first democratic elections the whole process 
was marked by a decisive role of only one player – the Croatian Communist Party. 
However, the party was everything but coherent. Decisive transitional battles took place 
just behind the doors of the party Central Committee. The reformist line within the party 
only gradually succeeded in neutralizing party hard-liners, which enabled them to take 
decisive steps toward democratization. There is no doubt that pressures coming from the 
media, intellectuals and public opinion and later actions of organized opposition parties 
provided precious support, and often political guidelines, to the reformists during the 
whole period, but these segments of society were not strong enough to create the need 
for negotiations between reformists and the opposition. Also, except one public petition 
organized by the opposition, the masses did not actively and extensively participate in 
politics in the period prior to the first elections, and violence was virtually unknown.  
 A decisive pressure for change came from the growing conflict at the level of the 
federal Communist Party and between the Yugoslav republics. Without initiatives and 
real power to efficiently oppose the galloping nationalistic and antidemocratic mass 
movement that had been spreading from Serbia since 1987 (endangering democratiza-
tion processes in other Yugoslav republics), the decision of the SKH-SDP in December 
1989 about the holding of multiparty elections was, for the Croatian communist reform-
ers, an exit from a nasty situation rather than a preferred democratic solution. 
 Their rather sudden decision had several functions. Firstly, the call for multiparty 
elections for the Parliament of the Republic Croatia was itself a powerful message to all 
other republics' leaderships (particularly to Serbian communists) as well as to their own 
hard-liners about desired direction of the political changes in Yugoslavia. Therefore it is 
not strange that the very decision was made and announced immediately prior to the 
14th congress of the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia held in January 1990, the 
final step in the dissolution of the unified Yugoslav communist organization. Secondly, 
with such a sudden step, Croatian reformists wanted to seize the still weakly organized 
domestic party scene and to improve their chances for electoral victory. By winning the 
election they would, thirdly, acquire much needed democratic legitimacy that, in turn, 
would enable them to play a greater role in the resolution of the Yugoslav conflict. For 
these reasons, the communist reformers, confident of their own electoral victory, did not 
take into consideration any possible negotiations with the opposition on such issues as 
securing transitional pace, the constitutional form of the new democracy or even the 
type of electoral system for the first elections. These tasks were left to be settled down 
after the elections. There was only a tacit agreement among the main parties that the 
first democratically elected parliament should act as a Constitutional Assembly and that 
new elections should be called as soon as possible after the adoption of the new consti-
tution. 
 However, the process went into the opposite direction. The right-wing – and, at the 
time, the most radical opposition party, HDZ – won the first elections, ensuring thus ab-
solute parliamentary majority and complete control over the second part of the transition 
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– constitutional making and institutional building. Unlike the first phase, this second 
phase was marked by growing tensions in Zagreb – Belgrade relations, as well as rela-
tions between Serbs and Croats within Croatia. Masses were mobilized by populist and 
ethnically exclusive appeals of their leaders to various public actions, which often led to 
violence. Gradually these tensions developed into the war between the Yugoslav Army, 
local Serbian militia and the regime of Slobodan Miloševic on the one side and the 
Croatian government, supported by the vast majority of population, on the other. 
 These briefly depicted developments and circumstances in Croatia from the late 
eighties to 19933 account to a great extent for the nature of the transition. It was a pre-
emptive, fast, and, especially at the beginning, relatively smooth transition in compari-
son with those in some other communist countries. Indeed, from the foundation of the 
first non-communist party to the first free multiparty elections it had passed only a year. 
From the decision on the organization of the first free elections to the adoption of the 
entirely new constitution by the newly elected Parliament a year had passed, too.4 
Within the next two and a half years all major institutions were established according to 
new constitutional procedures.5 If we take the functional establishment of the main 
democratic institutions and procedures as the end-point of transition, then 1993 or 1995 
the latest should be considered as the end of the transition in Croatia.  
 However, the lightness hides some perils, too. Due to the circumstances that perma-
nently worked in the direction of speeding up transitional decisions as well as to the 
situations of the dominant-player game (SKH in the first and HDZ in the second stage 
of the process), the need for arriving at the most important transitional and constitu-
tional choices through consensus was severely neglected. Dominant players in both 
phases were more concerned with their own calculations and shortsighted interests than 
with thoughts on the future stability of the democratic regime. As a result, none of the 
major institutions were established by the consent of other players and without huge di-
visions in the public. 
 The election law has been changed prior to every national or local election according 
to the interests and calculations of the ruling party, due to the fact that electoral law was 
not a part of the constitution and for its adoption only the absolute majority of all repre-
sentatives was required. Apart from this, electoral systems regularly produced manu-
factured parliamentary majorities, while support for proportional representation was 
prevalent in public and expert debates as a more honest and immanently democratic 
type of representation. Altogether it deepened disagreements between HDZ and the op-
position on the type of electoral system and questioned the legitimacy of the type of 
democracy that was developing. It also contributed to the development of a dangerous 
 
3 For a more detailed analyses of the transition in Croatia see Kasapović/Zakošek, 1997 and Grdešić, 1997.  
4 This, in a democratic sense, fairly correct text was among the first entirely new constitutions among the 
post-communist countries and, with some symbolic and linguistic changes from 1997, it was in use until 
recently. 
5 The last one was the establishment of the second Chamber of Parliament (the House of Counties) and 
the whole system of local representative and executive bodies through the elections held in February 1993. 
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perception among the public that elections have little to do with democracy since they 
are only a powerful tool serving incumbents in keeping power.6 
 A similar dispute has been existing with regard to the constitutionally defined semi-
presidential system. It was adopted in December 1990 as part of the Constitution and 
until the last elections represented the main object of criticism coming from the opposi-
tion parties, part of the public and experts. The changing of the existing type of legisla-
tive-executive relation toward a purer parliamentary system of government has been a 
constant point in the electoral and party platforms of almost all opposition parties in 
Croatia during nineties. However, this heavy criticism can not be fully attributed to the 
fact that the initial agreement on semi-presidentialism was never reached.7 It developed 
especially after it became obvious what the consequences of such a system of govern-
ment for the quality of democratic life are. As in the case of the electoral law, initial 
disagreement was enforced by later evaluations that, in turn, were based on initial dis-
agreements. And unlike other combinations, the combination of initial non-agreement 
and divergent interpretations of outcomes of institutional choices are very likely to fur-
ther deepen the existing conflict.8 According to Di Palma, democratic consolidation can 
be crafted almost entirely in the transitional phase if the main players achieve a suffi-
ciently strong consensus on the basic rules of the game (Di Palma, 1990, 137-155). 
Croatian parties simply failed to do that. 
 Yet, the primary lack of consensus refers in the case of Croatia to the basic dispute 
of which political community the Serbian national minority belongs to, where are the 
frontiers of the new state and what should be the constitutive principles of the new po-
litical community (Croatia). The dispute developed very soon into a sharp political divi-
sion along ethnic lines (Grdešić et al., 1991), with a pronounced role of the mass mobi-
lization. A part of the Serbian national minority, together with the main political parties 
representing the Serbs in Croatia, from 1990, and particularly from 1991, refused to ex-
press loyalty to Croatia as a sovereign and independent state. Thus the lack of the basic 
legitimacy of the newly formed state among the Serbian ethnic community was the 
main reason for their resistance to recognize the new Croatian legal system over the ter-
ritories in which Serbs constituted a majority of the population. The situation in which 
 
6 The electoral law for the 2000 parliamentary elections was actually the first electoral system adopted by 
the consent of all the relevant players. This development was mostly due to small electoral chances of the 
HDZ to win again. 
7 Grdešić's impression was “… that the new Constitution came into being through political cooperation 
and respect for political parties” and that “… some important compromises among the opposition, the 
President and the experts were struck”, out of which “… the most important one modified the presidential 
system of government…”. (Grdešić, 1997, 114). However, my impression is that none of the main opposition 
parties actually accepted semi-presidentialism from the beginning. The Constitution making involved a lot of 
bargaining and the consent to vote for the new Constitution by the opposition parties should not be interpreted 
as their acceptance of the proposed solutions. Simply, compromise does not yet entail consensus.  
8 We should distinguish between the type of the chosen institutions and the mode of arriving at the choice. 
There is no place here to discuss advantages and disadvantages of concrete institutional choices for the 
consolidation of new democracies and thus I am concerned only with the question of consensual institution 
building. 
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the Croatian state authorities, despite international recognition, were not able to exercise 
real power over roughly one third of Croatia’s territory lasted during the whole war – 
until summer 1995, when the Croatian Army in military action reunified most of the 
previously lost territories. 
 
 Institutionalizing Authoritarian Democracy 
 Like in the other countries that at that time started their transitions to democracy, the 
Croatian early transition was marked by the emergence of new, alternative movements 
that questioned the legitimacy of the old order. The anticommunist movement in Croatia 
had two organizational forms: the HDZ on one hand and several smaller parties that at 
the first elections joined into the KNS coalition on the other. The KNS broke apart al-
ready between the first and the second round of the 1990 elections, out of which later 
only HSLS and the newly created HNS survived as significant political parties. In this 
respect, the Croatian case only partly followed the pattern of other East-Central Euro-
pean countries, where political parties emerged after initial anticommunist movements 
fell apart. 
 However, the HDZ movement seems to be a distinct Croatian phenomenon that 
could be compared perhaps only to Meciar's HZDS in Slovakia, and even then only in 
some aspects.9 The crucial feature of the HDZ movement was that it neither split into 
several political parties, nor disappeared, nor, speaking from a political scientist’s point 
of view, transformed into a political party proper. Instead, after winning the first elec-
tions the movement made a powerful attempt to institutionalize in a form of political 
regime. This fairly, but not completely, successful institutionalization of the movement 
into the regime is often omitted when the political development in Croatia is analyzed. 
Most interpretations stop at the insight that the HDZ did not transform into a political 
party suitable to act within democratic institutions. This is undoubtedly a correct obser-
vation, but it fails to detect decisive changes that happened with the movement after the 
HDZ won the founding elections. 
 The HDZ entered the Croatian political scene in 1989 as a formally registered politi-
cal party, but its beginnings were marked by several features that allow us to talk about 
a populist movement rather than a party. Firstly, instead of a clear party program, the 
HDZ offered a fuzzy platform for democratic transition dominated by only one issue – 
sovereignty of the Croatian state. In the situation of the growing political conflict be-
tween Croatia and the Federation, this type of a simple national appeal to voters showed 
its major advantage in securing a wide popular support. Secondly, the leader of the 
movement, Franjo Tuđman, very soon became “untouchable” charismatic leader with 
almost messianic meaning for his followers, rather than a party leader. And thirdly, this 
highly emotional, nationalistic and historically oriented populism functioned as a strong 
incentive for considerable part of population to find in the movement much more than 
 
9 The HDZ and HZDS shared very much the same substantive features (like rhetoric, nationalistic 
policies, etc.), but the environment within which they developed and their position within the power 
constellations structurally differed. On democratic development in Slovakia see Szomolányi, 1997, 9-33.  
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one could demand from a political party – psychological security of collectivism in the 
times of rapid social changes and a promise for national and individual prosperity that, 
according to their beliefs, had been precluded to them during the communist Yugosla-
via. Another interesting fact was that at the very beginning the HDZ, because of the fear 
from the still unpredictable regime, preserved in its activities the image of a half-illegal 
organization, although other opposition parties emerged at the political scene in a far 
more open manner.10  
 After the HDZ won the 1990 elections, its gradual institutionalization started. Due to 
authoritarian nature of the movement, the type of transition (which in Croatian case en-
tailed simultaneously the process of state building) and the impact of the war, the 
movement transferred much of its values, vocabulary and interpretations of reality into 
the common symbolic and institutional patterns that were spread out on a large segment 
of the Croatian society. This was obvious in many domains: from an exclusive ethnic 
definition of the state and society, across dubious historical reinterpretations and rigid 
interpretations of the war for independence and national sovereignty to the cultivation of 
charismatic sentiments and authoritarian practice. These symbolic patterns, transmitted 
into formal and informal norms and rules, determined activities, behavior and expecta-
tions of many, not only political but also social, institutions and actors in such a com-
prehensive way that it is possible to talk about the regime institutionalization. The main 
condition for this transfer was the war, during which one particularistic movement was, 
in a great measure, misinterpreted for an encompassing national struggle for independence. 
 However, the process of institutionalization of the movement into the political re-
gime, gradually changed the original mechanisms by which the movement sustained its 
support among the citizens. Firstly, many prominent figures that were incumbents of the 
early movement in 1989 and 1990 in the later years stopped pursuing their political car-
riers or withdrew to politically marginal positions. Also, in order to fill in numerous 
new positions in the national and local government the movement had to open to many 
new politicians who originally were not members. The same phenomenon happened at 
the levels of voters between 1990 and 1992.11 After 1992 or 1993, the regime has sus-
tained its stability, but with decisive differences from the movement in 1990 even in the 
terms of individual actors. 
 Secondly, as institutionalization of the nationalistic discourse was progressing and 
Croatian sovereignty becoming secure, nationalistic type of ideological appeals less and 
less served as incentives by which the regime could maintain support and loyalty. At the 
level of elite and party members, ideological incentives have been replaced by material 
incentives, and clientelism became a more reliable method of keeping on loyalty to the 
regime. This created strong ties among state institutions, the party and economy, which 
 
10 The famous slogan of the HDZ at the 1990 elections – “everybody knows” shows best the nature of the 
party. This certainly the most efficient slogan in the short democratic history of Croatia, was spreading at the 
same time both a feeling of belonging and a feeling of conspiracy.  
11 Although this fact is hard to observe at the aggregate level, figures generated from the individual level 
of analysis (public opinion polls) showed that in that period the party exchanged roughly a half of its voters 
from 1990, in contrast to the following electoral periods marked by a considerably larger portion of the party 
standpatters (Čular, forthcoming).  
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resulted in creation of a powerful network of the leading segments of politics and econ-
omy. These informal rules have penetrated and dominated formal state and economic 
institutions. Although ideology continued playing a considerable role in the mobiliza-
tion of voters, even at this level the regime had to strengthen its efforts by pursuing 
policies of economic populism. 
 Thirdly, the charisma of the leader of the HDZ movement was additionally backed 
by introducing the constitutional design of semi-presidentialism. In this way, the char-
ismatic nature of the movement was efficiently transmitted to the state organization and 
society as a whole, since an already existing charismatic person got also institutional 
support. Apart from wide prerogatives by which the semi-presidential system supplied 
the President, this institutional legitimization of the personal charisma helped Franjo 
Tuđman to exercise a full control over both the state and the party. The result was an 
extreme concentration of political power in the hands of one man. He used his power 
extensively in decision-making in the parliament, government, party, but indirectly also 
in daily local, educational or sport matters. Simply, the autocratic way of ruling was not 
only a feature of a party or a segment of government; it became an institution underly-
ing a wide range of political and social activities.  
 The previous regime came into existence as the result of the institutionalization of 
the HDZ populist movement into a form of political regime. It is quite clear that the 
main prerequisite for it was political power that the HDZ seized at the 1990 elections. 
The fact that the party succeeded in maintaining the electoral support at all later elec-
tions and has stayed in control of the government for another nine years allow us to in-
terpret the above sketched changes not only as temporary patterns, but also as the proc-
ess of institutionalization of a regime that, in the terms of its substance, shares a lot of 
features with an authoritarian regime. However, the regime did not manage to ensure 
sufficient support that would enable it to discard the basic democratic procedures and 
institutions. Although fragile, often facing the conflicting practices and sometimes mis-
used by the ruling party, these institutional constraints have precluded full institutionali-
zation of the authoritarian dictatorship and forced the incumbent party to test its legiti-
macy at regularly held elections. The abolishment of the existing democratic game 
would therefore have been a prerequisite for the authoritarian order to become fully in-
stitutionalized. It seems that the most suitable term for the existing type of the regime 
between 1990 and 1999 would be authoritarian democracy.12 
 An authoritarian democracy is an unconsolidated democracy almost by definition 
since the type of politics that develops within such a regime lacks a possibility to reach 
the basic quality of the democratic game. Moreover, authoritarian democracy in Croatia 
has precluded the process of democratic consolidation itself. It became the subject and 
the object at the same time of a sharp political divide that evolved around the question 
 
12 Every attempt at classifying the past regime within one of the existing democratic types would yield 
inconsistencies. In my opinion, authoritarian democracy (as opposed to authoritarian dictatorship or 
authoritarianism on one hand and to liberal democracy on the other) would be a more suitable and less 
contradictory title than, for instance, dictatorship with democratic legitimacy as suggested by Pusić (1999, 75-
80). In any case, what is important is that the functioning of regime in Croatia was much closer to “delegative 
democracy” (O`Donnell, 1994) than to “liberal democracy”.  
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of the democratic legitimacy of the existing regime, the nature of the Croatian democ-
racy and meaningfulness of the democratic game. However, if a polity is divided by 
such a fundamental clash that involves so different interpretations of the existing regime 
ranging from “one of the most democratic states in Europe” to the labels such as “dic-
tatorship” or “totalitarianism”, and if this is reflected in the political field of party com-
petition, it is clear that crucial implication of this type of the politics is stagnation in 
terms of democratic quality.13 
 Another feature of the regime that has evolved from a wide populist movement is 
that it naturally tends to jeopardize crafted democratic institutions and procedures, 
which makes the democratic game uncertain also with regard to its durability. This is 
embodied in the very logic of institutionalization of the authoritarian democracy, since 
the democratic game creates an obstacle to its final stage of institutionalization – au-
thoritarian dictatorship. But even if the regime does not make an open step towards 
abolishment of the democratic procedures, the fragility of democracy is still present in 
the regime's attempt to use democratic procedures for the aims that conflict with the 
very sense contained in those procedures. Finally, unpredictability is a permanent and 
inherent characteristic of authoritarian democracies, even then when all rules of the 
game are fully respected. 
 
 The Problems of Democratic Consolidation 
 The obstacles to democratic consolidation, created by a particular type of democracy 
developing in Croatia, made that democracy was not “the only game in town” 
(Linz/Stepan, 1996, 15). Apart from the lack of the basic consensus at the constitutional 
level, this can be shown also at the behavioural and attitudinal level of analysis. 
 At the behavioural level consolidated democracy means that there is no political 
force with significant support – particularly a political party – whose loyalty to democ-
racy is questionable (Gunther/Diamandouros/Puhle, 1995, 1-32). The most transparent 
case of such a political force are anti-system parties, which openly express their anti-
democratic attitudes, present political programs advocating an antidemocratic alterna-
tive and spend significant material resources to overthrow democracy. In most democ-
racies these forces are usually extreme, left-revolutionary or neo-fascist, parties.  
 However, anti-system forces do not need to be so transparent and organized in the 
form of a political party. They can operate as groups within democratically established 
institutions, particularly the military, the police, and intelligence services – the institu-
tions built up on the mechanisms of physical coercion over society. Rather than openly 
expressing their anti-system attitudes, these groups or group networks can de facto ob-
tain wide autonomy within the system, making decisions of the elected political au-
thorities dependent on or limited by their consent. Such a, de facto, created “reserved 
 
13 The best example of how a need to oppose to the regime can undermine the meaningfulness of 
competition is the electoral coalition of the opposition parties at the 1995 local elections in Zagreb. As the aim 
was to prevent the HDZ from winning majority, the coalition consisted of seven parties that were spread from 
the left to the far right (Kasapović, 1998). In a similar vein parties competed in the 2000 elections.  
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domain of power” undermines the logic of the constitutionally guaranteed democratic 
order, makes every change of government at elections troublesome and uncertain and 
acts as a threatening force every time when its out-of-the-system-position is openly put 
into question. 
 Finally, sometimes a party falls in between and it is hard to judge whether it is a 
loyal or disloyal actor within democratic polity. Such parties usually express ambigu-
ous, occasional and rather weak support to democracy or they are sharply divided into 
two or more factions each of them showing different behaviour with regard to democ-
ratic norms. Also, a characteristic of semi-loyal actors is that there are significant dis-
crepancies in their rhetoric and their behaviour.14 
 The most open anti-system party in Croatia was SDS, acting from 1990 to 1992 as 
the main political representative of the Serbian national minority. The party openly op-
posed the constitution of the state, withdrew from Parliament and, as the leading force, 
engaged in the violent ethnic rebellion of part of the Serbs living in Croatia. The party 
was banned by the decision of the Constitutional Court in 1992 on the base of the Con-
stitutional Article that protects territorial integrity and political order of the state. After 
military defeat of the Serbian state proclaimed by this party, its activity ceased. 
 Another case of disloyal opposition could refer to HSP, the ultra-nationalist neo-fas-
cist Croatian party. The party entered Parliament after the 1992 elections with 7% of the 
votes and 5 out of 138 seats in the House of Representatives. In 1995 its electoral sup-
port decreased to 5% and 4 parliamentary mandates. However, its relatively weak elec-
toral support and the fact that party leadership peacefully participated within the democ-
ratic institutions turned gradually this party from organizer of military units at the be-
ginning of the war into an actor willing to make compromises in order to protect its po-
litical position. This development was obvious especially after the HSP changed its 
leadership in 1993.15 Yet, the party's radical right-wing position, aggressive rhetoric and 
mobilization potential should not be underestimated as possible threat to the democratic 
process in the future. 
 The biggest problem for Croatian democracy came from the behaviour of the ruling 
party HDZ and its leader, the President of the Republic Franjo Tuđman. Encouraged by 
the majority support that both the party and the President have obtained at every na-
tional election until 2000, the party exhibited all the features of a semi-loyal political 
actor. From the very beginning the ruling party had been expressing its ambiguous and 
selective attitude with regards to the acceptance of democratic norms and rules.16 Also, 
it has tended to misrepresent their often sectarian policies for unquestionable national 
interest and to accuse other parties as anti-system or anti-state elements every time 
 
14 The concepts of loyalty, disloyalty and semi-loyalty to democracy are originally developed in Linz, 
1991, 27-38.  
15 Two prominent party activists were killed during this period, which is the fact that should not be 
omitted in judging the changing political role of the HSP.  
16 In a very symbolic manner that happened at the ceremony of taking the president's oath of office after 
the 1992 elections, when President Tuđman supplemented the legally worded oath with his own words.  
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when the opposition has tried to criticise governmental policies. The dominance of the 
Presidential Office over Parliament and other state institutions has represented a special 
problem. It occurred not only as a result of the constitutionally defined broad presiden-
tial prerogatives within the semi-presidential system, but also by the establishment of 
several presidential bodies that have been endangering the constitutionally proclaimed 
separation of power and centralized decision-making process in a constitutionally prob-
lematic way. 
 Furthermore, a decisive element of a consolidated democracy – unreserved accep-
tance of the electoral outcomes – has been at times lacking on the side of HDZ.17 Other 
evidence of the HDZ’s semi-loyalty could be its secret negotiations with the HSP, 
which ended in a kind of informal coalition between the two parties in the 1997 elec-
tions for the House of Counties and local councils. If we add here the general govern-
mental unwillingness to protect human rights (especially when they are violated by the 
state administration), its arrogance towards the role and decisions of the Constitutional 
Court, or simply its threatening political rhetoric unsuitable to peaceful democratic 
processes, it is not hard to see that democracy in Croatia was not fully respected by the 
very same party who formed the majority and exercised executive power. 
 Yet, the semi-loyal behaviour of the President and the ruling party was only a conse-
quence of an attempt to balance among several informal factions acting within the party, 
out of which some behaved as proper disloyal groups and the others showed more re-
spect for the established democratic norms and procedures. These divisions became 
quite obvious after Spring 1994 when a faction split from the HDZ and formed its own 
party, accusing at the same time the right wing of the party for antidemocratic tenden-
cies and the President for tolerating such a state. Since this rift it has become clear that a 
right-wing group of highly positioned partisans with solid ties within the military, po-
lice, intelligence and several civil organizations (e.g. associations for war veterans, 
refugee associations, trade unions) actually represents a strong anti-system force. Presi-
dent Tuđman never showed sufficient will and power to eliminate the sources of such 
tendencies. He has rather used the existing constellations to make balance within the 
party, hoping that in such a way he secured his full control over the party. 
 On the other hand the left-wing opposition parties and their leaders have not en-
gaged in any kind of anti-system actions. Their opposition and pressures on the gov-
ernment have been strictly carried out within the established institutions and procedures 
and only exceptionally included such measures as withdrawal from Parliament or par-
liamentary committees. They have not been particularly prone to engage in the street 
demonstrations or any kind of mass actions either. Notwithstanding this, due to frequent 
public accusations from HDZ leaders for anti-system and anti-state behaviour, a consid-
erable part of the public considered the opposition parties as the main threat to full de-
velopment of national interests. This has made the overall political atmosphere impreg-
nated with deep mutual distrust, uncertainty and public diversion on who is and who is 
 
17 The most obvious case was the so called “Zagreb crisis”. After it had won the 1995 local elections for 
the Zagreb City Assembly, the coalition of opposition parties was hindered by the President to form the local 
government. Although his decision was founded in the positive law, his public statement said enough: “We 
can not allow an 'oppositional situation' in the capital”. 
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not a loyal democratic actor. Therefore, it is not strange that the trust of Croatian citi-
zens in the central democratic institution – elections – in 1995 was very close to, or 
even less than, their trust in the founding 1990 elections held under control of the com-
munist reformers, as illustrated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Perceptions of the Fairness of Elections 
(%) 1990 1992 1995 2000 
Yes, fully 13 12 15 11 
Yes, mainly 39 38 38 40 
No 10 16 16 10 
Don’t Know 38 35 32 40 
Note: The question was framed as follows: “Will the forthcoming elections be fair?” 
Source: FPS 1990, 1992, 1995, 2000. 
 
 This is a suitable moment to turn to the third level of consolidation – the attitudinal 
one. In a consolidated democracy, democracy acquires widespread legitimacy. How-
ever, one should understand the term legitimacy in its modest meaning – as a general 
commitment of citizens to democracy, shown by the fact that the overwhelming major-
ity of citizens consider democracy as the only legitimate system or prefer it over other, 
non-democratic, forms of government.18 
 In this respect consolidation does not necessarily require wide citizens' support to 
the particular established type of democracy; disagreements on specific institutions and 
their constitutionally designed roles and relations are possible as long as citizens on the 
whole consider the procedures by which the rules are decided upon as legitimate. Nor 
should legitimacy be equaled with deep internalization of advanced democratic political 
culture including a better popular understanding of the political process, rationality in 
political behaviour and high political participation. While certainly desirable for the 
quality of democratic life, neither represents a task of democratic consolidation. 
 Judging from Table 2, the majority of citizens prefer democracy to the rule of a 
“strong leader”. However, there is an impression that the combined figures in the sec-
ond and third row (“authoritarian” and undecided respondents) are still extremely high 
for a democracy to be successfully consolidated. Moreover, it seems that the achieved 
level of popular support to democracy changes very slightly or not at all over time. In 
order to talk about consolidated democracy at the level of mass attitudes at least 70% 
 
18 After David Easton this concept of legitimacy is commonly named “diffuse legitimacy” or “diffuse 
system support”. For argumentation why such general support for democracy can survive notwithstanding 
widespread public dissatisfaction with the outcomes (due to economic crisis, bad government performance or 
low efficacy and effectiveness of the system) and even low trust in political institutions see Morlino/Montero, 
1995; Linz, 1991, 16-23;and particularly Weil, 1989, 682-706. 
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citizens of a democratic polity should express clear and undoubted preference to 
democracy.19 
 
Table 2: Democratic Legitimacy in Croatia 
 (%)  1995 2000 
Democracy is always the best 52 53 
We need a strong leader 27 23 
Don’t know 22 24 
Note: The question was framed as follows: “Democracy sometimes does not function 
smoothly. Some people think that what we need is a strong leader who will “resolve 
things”. Others think that democracy is still the best solution, even if it does not func-
tion smoothly. What is your opinion?” 
Source: FPS 1995, 2000. 
 
 Finally, there is the question of how strong anti-system behaviour is supported at the 
mass level, since it is not the same if anti-democratic attitudes are spread among the 
supporters of all the parties equally or some parties gain support overwhelmingly by the 
authoritarian voters. While the former situation still leaves room for the party elites and 
party organizations to successfully control undesirable developments at the mass level, 
the latter usually shows that a disloyal or semi-loyal elite can easily mobilize its elector-
ate to threaten democracy, which poses additional problems to the democratic consoli-
dation. As it can be seen from Table 3, the Croatian case is closer to the latter situation. 
 As the difference between the percentage of “democrats” and “authoritarians” for 
the whole sample were +25 and +30 in 1995 and 2000 respectively, HDZ and HSP are, 
beside HSS in 2000, the only parties who attract authoritarian voters above the national 
average, and these are, as we have seen, also the parties whose commitment to democ-
racy at the behavioural level is the most questionable. Also, HDZ in both years and HSP 
in 2000 were the only parties that attracted “authoritarian” more than “democratic” vot-
ers. On the whole, it is possible to distinguish among parties whose electorate did not 
change so much its profile with regard to acceptance of democratic values (HDZ, HNS, 
IDS) and parties that experienced rather visible changes in this respect (HSP, HSLS, 
SDP). While among the HSP and HSLS supporters the portion of authoritarian voters 
has undoubtedly increased between 1995 and 2000, SDP has been improving its democ-
ratic image along with broadening its electoral support. As a result, in 2000 parties 
could be grouped in several groups: parties which embrace a high percentage of “de-
mocrats” (HNS, LS and SDP), parties with somewhat lower portion of “democrats” 
(HSLS, IDS) and parties among whose supporters prevail “authoritarians” (HSP, HDZ). 
HSS voters belong somewhere in between with a rather balanced relationship between 
 
19 For a comprehensive data on democratic legitimacy in the “third wave democracies” during eighties 
and nineties see Diamond, 1998, 174-184. Unfortunately, due to entirely different wording of survey 
questions, non of these figures can be directly compared to Croatia. 
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“democrats” and “authoritarians”. If we take into consideration the actual electoral 
strength of the parties, the voters not committed to the democratic game who in 1995 
overwhelmingly supported HDZ, in 2000 are more dispersed to other political parties. 
This development could be conducive to the process of spreading democratic legitimacy 
in the future. However, in the measure in which “authoritarians” turned away from any 
political party in 2000, it could posit new problems to democratic consolidation.20  
  
Table 3: Democratic Legitimacy and Party Preference (horizontal percentage) 

















HDZ 40 45 15 -5 38 45 17   -7 
HNS* 71 10 19 +61 79 12   9 +67 
HSLS 72 11 17 +61 66 21 13 +45 
HSS* 50 24 26 +26 39 26 35 +13 
HSP 56 34 10 +22 33 46 22 - 13 
IDS* 65 14 22 +51 58 11 32 +47 
LS - - - - 72   3 25 +69 
SDP 59 25 16 +34 72   9 20 +63 
Cramer’s V .24** .29** 
Note: For the formulation of the question, see Table 2. 
* the 1995 figures refer to the party identifiers and not party voters 
** p < .01 
Source: FPS 1995, 2000. 
 
 Consolidation and the Basic Quality of Democratic Game 
 In conclusion, we have seen that the established democracy in Croatia is still a frag-
ile one in which the rules of the democratic game have not yet been widely accepted by 
citizens, acknowledged by political parties and generally taken as a habitual part of the 
political process. Moreover, some minor improvements notwithstanding, we cannot 
state that the process of consolidation ever started at all, since considerable obstacles to 
such a process to take place existed until 2000. These obstacles, however, are only in a 
smaller part inherited from the socialist past (I primarily take into account the lack of 
significant democratic political culture and traditions); they have been created during 
Croatian transition and after, due to the type of transition, the war and nature of the rul-
ing party. This only on the surface stands in sharp contrast to a rather fast process of 
transition and establishment of the main political institutions. Much of the Croatian 
postponed consolidation phase can be accounted for exactly by the principle result of 
the transition in Croatia – though not complete, in a great part successful, institutionali-
zation of authoritarian democracy. That is why the lack of consensus on the formal type 
 
20 Although it is hard to catch sufficient portion of abstinents in public polls to make reliable conclusions, 
there is a serious impression that exactly this happened in the 2000 election in Croatia.  
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of political system, behavior of the main political actors, and public attitudes to democ-
racy are not only just separate dimensions that seek to be successfully kept on the con-
solidation track; they were coupled together in the form of an intense regime divide that 
underlined the whole political life in contemporary Croatia and determined the logic of 
party competition, coalition strategies and voters' electoral choices. 
 Although these traces in a great part continue to exist in Croatian political life also 
after the January-February elections, these elections were a cut-point from which it is 
possible to start a careful crafting of the process of democratic consolidation. Successful 
consolidation of democracy in Croatia means step-by-step strategy for isolation or/and 
incorporation of anti-system opposition parties, adapting the basic rules of the game in 
such a way to secure a wider consensus among both elites and the masses and strength-
ening democratic legitimacy. The pace and nature of gradual dissolution of the institu-
tionalized patterns of political behaviour (primarily with regard to institutionalized 
group interests) which has to be undertaken by the winning coalition on the one hand 
and the behaviour of the former semi-loyal ruling party elite on the other are variables 
that will most directly determine the success of the consolidation process. In this re-
spect, the way in which the new ruling coalition and the President led and completed the 
process of the constitutional changes do not promise much.  
 The situation in which Croatian democracy for a long time was not (and still is not) 
“the only game in town”, but rather “a game with reserves” ruins not so much the 
chances for democratic survival, but rather for improvements of the basic quality of the 
democratic game. One should not aim so high to include in the term efficient and effec-
tive economic and social policies, even less the general quality of life of the population. 
The basic quality of the democratic game refers simply to the point from which gradual, 
but comprehensive, improvements in the political inputs of democracy are allowed: 
more transparent competition, better representation, responsiveness and accountability, 
more effective participation, more rational electoral choices, etc. In the case of an un-
consolidated democracy such as Croatia, regardless of how such a democracy survived 
and how long it continues to survive, that point can not be easily reached. 
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